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THE EURASIAN SCHOOL: 
BETWEEN METAPHYSICS A N D  SCIENCE
Lev Gumiłov was eyewitness of most tragic events that occurred in the 20th-century 
Russian history. He is believed to have uttered the significant words, so charaeteristic 
of contemporary Russian nationalism: “If Russia is going to be saved, she can only 
be saved as the Eurasiatic power and solely through Eurasianism”1. The Eurasiatic 
School constituted the last chapter in the history of Russian nationalist ideologies of 
the past two hundred years. Its ideology is the quintessence and the fullest expression 
of modem Russian political thought. On the Russian “market o f ideas”, it outstripped 
other concepts based on Slavophilism, Occidentalism, monarchism or Bolshevism. 
Despite its 19th-century origins, Eurasianism is a typically 20th-century concept. It first 
appeared in the circles of Russian political emigres in 1920’s, found its continuation in 
the views of Gumilov, the creator of the theory of ethnogenetic; at present its basie 
ideas are pursued by the most reactive nationalists including the leading geopolitician 
of the post-Soviet era, A. Dugin.
The Eurasian School originated in the circles of Russian post-revolutionary 
emigration in the late 1920s in Sofia; and was later influential in Prague, Berlin, Paris 
and other emigrant centers in Western Europę. Its most outstanding activists were the 
linguist and ethnologist M. Trubetskoy, the geographer P. Savitskii, the Greek clergy- 
man and theologian G. Florovskii, the philosopher and musicologist P. Suvtsinskii, the 
philosopher L. Karsavin, the historian G. Viemadskii and others. It is worth pointing 
out that most members of the movement achieved outstanding results in both 
domains they practiced, namely science and philosophy, irrespective of their political 
engagement in the movement activity. Polemics coneeming the reasons for the
1 L. G u m i 1 o w, Rilmy Jewrazii, Epochi i ciwilizacii, Moscow 1993, p. 31.
Bolshevik Revolution, which burst among Russian emigres in the 1920s, were the 
source of the movement. The two million Russian emigrants in respect to their 
political orientation could roughly be divided into two fighting camps: the liberals and 
the monarchists. The liberał camp accused the fossilised monarchist circles of being 
responsible for the revolution, they were incapable of carrying out modemisation and 
democratisation of the country, which was backward in many respects, at least tens of 
times compared to West-European countries. The monarchists considered the 
revolution to be degradation of the state and society and an apocalyptical disaster, and 
looked for the way back to the lost pre- revolutionary reality. They resembled the 20th- 
century French traditionalists pining for the ancient regime of the kind of J. de Maistre 
or L. de Bonald.
The Eurasiatists constituted the third force, imperceptible at the beginning but 
in time gaining in popularity. They searched for the deep and hidden reasons for 
revolution and came to the unexpected and paradoxical from liberał and monarchist 
point of view conclusion that the Bolshevik Revolution, despite its tragic, was not an 
accidental phenomenon but was deep-rooted in the Russian history especially in the 
18th and 19th century Petersburg Russia. The revolution was initiated by a handful of 
revolutionists who did not count on political stage but were able to release the hidden 
forces ingrained in the Russian mentality, and therefore was the phenomenon that 
was necessary and not accidental, contrary to the statements of most of historians. 
The principal cause of the revolution was the drive to Europę developing sińce the 
times of Peter I as well as the constant degeneration of the Russian Empire. This 
interpretation of the Revolution coexisted with another, equally original, according to 
which the revolution was sensu stricto a Russian and not a universal event. G. Flo- 
rovskii wrote, “Revolution is a Russian business -  on account of its genesis, sense, 
objective meaning -  what is disclosed in it is the Russian truth, the truth about 
Russia”2. The Eurasian interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution and especially the 
theory about its folk and national character aroused a scandal and ideological 
isolation o f Eurasiasits among representatives of Russian emigration.
It is tum to the West taking place sińce the reign of Peter I and the departure 
from Eurasian roots that were responsible in Eurasiatists opinion for the majority of 
Russian social and political conflicts which happened during the 19th and 20th 
centuries preceding the “sadness” of the period of the revolution and the civil war. 
Two centuries of St Petersburg Russia prepared the revolution. It could have taken 
a different shape and broken out at a different time but its outbreak was inevitable. 
The Bolsheviks, unaware of the real character of their revolution, initiated in fact 
Russia’s return to the Eurasian sources. It is generally accepted that the year 1920 
marked the beginning of the Eurasian movement M. Trubetskoy’s book entitled 
Europę and Humanity was published in Sophia in which the concept of Eurasia did 
not appear yet but the message of the book was significantly anti-European3. Thus,
2 G. F lo r o v s k i i ,  O patriotizmie praviednom i griehovom, [in:] P. S a v i ts k i i, A. K .artasev, A. S u v -  
t s in s k i i ,  N. T r u b e tsk o i, G. F lo r o v s k ii ,  P. B i t s i l i i ,  Na pulinh. Utvierzdienie yevraziytsev. Kniga vtoraia, 
Berlin 1922, p. 278.
3 N. T r u b e tsk o i, Yevropa i tsielovietsiestvo, Sophia 1920.
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the Eurasiatists refer in their radical anti-Oceidentalism to the tradition of Russian 
nationalism and the intellectual history of the school begins with Trubetskoy’s work 
where the latter concept was emphasised. Eurasianism is as anti-Westem as it is pro- 
Asian, and it is hard to define unambiguously which of the two trains of thought 
prevails.
The ambiguous attitude towards Bolshevism, the condemnation of revolutionary 
terror on the one hand with the conviction that the Revolution was subconsciously right 
reaction at the progressive Westemisation of the Empire on the other, was determining 
the history of the movement in the period between wars. Eurasiatists were convinced 
that the days of Bolshevik ideology based on specific Lenin-Stalin version of Marxism 
were approaching the end and that Eurasianism could fili the void. In the Soviet state 
which emerged as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, Eurasiatists accepted 
nationalism, etatism, idiocracy meaning the State and society based on particular 
ideology, isolationism, and, to a great extent, even industry nationalization and 
agriculture collectivisation. The positive attitude towards Eastem Christianity presented 
by Eurasiatists was beside the condemnation of terror one of the basie difference 
between Bolsheviks and them. The role of the Orthodox Christianity cannot be 
restricted to religion only; in the futurę Empire it should constitute the integral part of 
Eurasiatic idiocracy. Because of the convergence of many Bolsheviks’ and Eurasia­
tists’ opinions the latter were convinced that in the presence of devaluation of the 
Russian version of Marxism the convergence of the two ideological movements and 
slow reduction of negative elements of the Soviet State were possible. The Soviet State 
as a result of such evolution could be converted into Eurasian Empire. The Eurasiatists 
started to get in touch with the representatives of the Soviet authorities and intelligence 
service in the West. One should mention here especially philo-Bolshevik stream of the 
movement clustered round the Yevrasia magazine, represented by, among others, 
L. Karsavin, D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii, and S. Efron. All of them were in touch with the 
Soviet authorities and all retumed to the Soviet Union and were executed or died in 
Soviet camps4.
The starting point of Eurasiatic historiosophy was conviction that Eurasia 
situated between Europę and Asia is a separate territory from geographical and 
historical point of view. For Eurasiatists the term “Eurasia” did not mean just 
a simple sum of two continents but their interior in the sense provided by the English 
geographer H. J. Mackinder’s Heartland. Western Europę, India, China or Japan did 
not belong to thus understood Eurasia. Centrality (sredinost) was the most essential 
feature of Eurasia. The Eurasian territory demanded union for geographical reasons. 
The union took place three times during its history: for the first time it was united in 
the 7th century under the Old Turkish Khanate, then in the 13th century within the 
Mongolian Empire, and for the third time in the Russian Empire. The Russian 
messianic ideology has never avoided expressing its ideas in geographical categories. 
A good example is the 19th-century concept of R. Danilevskii, a Slavophile, who in 
the work entitled Russia and Europę, postulated the construction of a Slavonic
“ R. P a r a d o v s k i ,  Eurasian Empire o f  Russia. A study o f  ideas, Toruń 2001, pp. 47-48.
Empire with the Capital in Tsarogrod (Constantinople), and its complete isolation 
from Western Europę. The representatives of Eurasianism fully developed the idea of 
geographical justification of Russia’s separateness using the concepts of the 20th 
century political geography and geopolitics.
The Russian national messianic ideologists who were under the influence of 
Christian millenarianism perceived Russia as the third and the last Rome. The vision 
of history as developing through three successive epochs, the last of which is 
simultaneously the finał one, is a constant component of millenary and semi-millenary 
ideologies sińce Joachim of Fiore times until the 20th-century totalitarianism5. The idea 
of the Third Rome originated in the 16th-century Russia when a monk called 
Philoteous wrote a letter to the Great Duke of Moscow, Vasil III, in which he described 
the fali of the first two Romes, and Moscow as the third and the finał one. For 
Eurasiatists, Russia is rather the third “Steppe Empire” than the third Rome. It is 
connected with the change of the perspective of Russian messianic thought, which was 
accompanied by specific historiosophical revolution. One of its symptoms was the 
departure from the 19th-century pan-Slavism. The basie Eurasiatic conviction that 
Russia from geographical point of view is a separate territory was expressed by 
permanent references to geography and especially to the elassies of geopolitics. The 
dualistic geopolitical models opposing maritime and land powers that originated from 
Mackinder’s concept were particularly popular. The essence of Russia cannot be 
reduced either to the Orthodox religion or to ethnic separateness of Eastem Slavs. 
Eurasiatists often connected it with geographical space and landscape. It is in a sense 
the continuation of the mediaeval idea of the “Holy Family”. So far, none of the 
Christian nations called its land the holy one reserving this designation to Palestine. 
The first Eurasiatic politician who introduced and justified the concept of Russian 
imperial space was the geographer, P. Savitskii6.
The Eurasian historiosophy in spite of its inveteracy in the tradition of Russian 
nationalism is quite different from the past projects of Russian historiosophy. It is 
connected with revisionist reinterpretation of Kievan Rus and the Russian Empire. 
The previous Russian historiosophy, even anti-Westem, tumed away from Asia too. 
The Slavophil apology of Orthodox Christianity and Slavonic nations despite its anti- 
Occidentalism stressed the genetic relationships between Russia and Eastern Europę 
renouncing the connections with Asian, Turanian tradition. Finding cultural and 
civilization Asian elements in the Russian State was nothing new among western 
historians while in Russia it was ignored as if the fact was embarrassing. H. Ka­
mieński, as far as Polish 20th-century philosophers are concemed, pointed out the 
genetic relationships not only between Russian and Eastem Slavonic people but also, 
for example, with peoples of Asian steppe in his book entitled Russia and Europę. 
Poland. The most outstanding 20th-century Polish philosopher of civilization F. 
Koneczny shared his opinion. In reference to F. Koneczny’s concept of civilization 
pluralism one can notice several analogies between the Polish philosopher’s 
Turanian civilization and the concept of Eurasia developed by Russian ideologists.
5 N. C o h n , The Pursuit o f  the Millennium, London 1957.
6 R. P a r a d o w s k i ,  op. cit., p. 13.
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Turanian civilization based on the model of social life based on camping and military 
naturę originated from political and social systems of Eurasiatic nomadic peoples, 
and its 20th-century manifestation was Bolshevism which attempted to destroy Latin 
civilization. It seems that the concept of “Turanism” in Konieczny’s philosophy of 
civilization and “Eurasianism” are largely synonymous.
The reinterpretation of Eastem European history manifested itself in the 
friendly attitude towards nomadic peoples, the awareness of ethnic discontinuity of 
the Moscow State and Kievan Rus, and even in the treatment of the relation between 
medieval Russia and the Mongoł Golden Hordę in the category of defensive alliance. 
The choice made by Alexander Nevsky long before the Principality of Moscow had 
been shaped was a crucial moment in the history o f medieval Russia. Confronting the 
double threat, Tatar from the East and Swedish from the West, he surrendered to the 
Tatars and directed his forces against Western enemies. It was -  according to Eu­
rasiatic historians -  the right choice, which saved Russia against cultural and 
civilization dependence on the Latin West7. The subordination of the Russian 
Principalities to the Golden Hordę enabled them to save their Russian and Orthodox 
identity, which was not possible in the case of Ukrainę and Belarus, subordinated to 
Poland and Lithuania.
L. Gumilov, a historian, geographer, ethnologist, and well-known investigator 
of the steppe peoples’ history continued Eurasiatic thought in the Soviet Union. He 
declared himself the last Eurasiatist8. Gumilov underpinned Eurasiatic thesis 
conceming geographical separateness of Russia with the theory of ethnos -  great 
historical units connected with the geographical space in which they can be found. 
Ethnos came into being in the natural process of ethnogeny. Every ethnos develops 
through a few phases; from a pasyonaric impulse (“pasyonarics” are the ethnos 
founders) through the phases of strain, mertness, acme, reactionary, to the memoriał 
phase of its decline. The periodicity of the process of ethnogeny is similar to the 
concepts in the philosophy of culture and civilization, especially to those of N. Da- 
nilevskii and O. Spengler, and to those developed by English theoreticians E. Hun­
tington and A. Toynbee. One of the great ethnoses is the Russian “super ethnos” 
which consists of Slavonic, Finno-Ugrian, and Altaic ethnic elements. Gumilov, like 
his Eurasiatic predecessors, is aware of the severance of ethnic continuity between 
Kievan Rus and Russia. Great Novgorod was the last ethnic splinter of Kievan Rus 
but the Moscow State is not a continuation o f the Great Kiev tradition9. The 
consolidation of huge territories from the Baltic countries to the Pacific Ocean under 
the power of Moscow was the beginning of the homogeneous Russian State, which 
consisted at the same time of many ethnic elements of the Russian super ethnos. The 
short outline of the history o f Eurasiatic school and its ideological characteristics 
presented above brings out the differences between Eurasianism and other historie 
schools of Russian political thought. The Eurasiatic school did not emerge in an 
ideological vacuum, its features include radical anti-Europeanism, nationalism, and
7G. V ie r n a d s k i i ,  D vapodviga sviatogo Aleksandra Nevskogo, “Nash sovriemiennik” 1992, no. 3.
8 L. G u m ilo v ,  Ritmy Jewrazii, Epochi i ciwilizacii.,., p. 10.
9 Id em , Od Rusi do Rosji. Szkice z  historii etnicznej, Warsaw 1996, pp. 128-132.
the apology o f the Orthodox Christianity common to other schools. Still, the most 
interesting elements of its ideological structure are new themes including the 
following:
• geographical, or in Gumilov’s ethnogeny even biological, starting point in historio­
sophy formation;
• revisionist (in relation to the traditional Russian historiography) attitude to the history 
of Russia, both medieval and the 20th-century;
• the reinterpretation of the concept of Russian nation: it is not a monolith any more 
(which it was in Gumilov’s theory) but consists of ethnic and national elements 
concentrated in the same super ethnos;
• the concept of idiocracy according to which the power of differently comprehended 
a priori idea will be the essence of the system of futurę Eurasiatic Empire contrary to 
the Western democracies;
• the rejection of eschatological problems, which were the central axis of almost all 
currents of Russian political thought, and especially the departure from orthodox 
millenarism and the interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution not as a global event but 
a local, specifically Russian one;
• specific naturalism in opposition to eschatologism which brings Eurasiatic ideology 
close to the classics of philosophy of civilization (e.g. O. Spengler and A. Toynbee), 
who often used spatial and geographical categories in their historiosophical reflections.
The evaluation of the work of Eurasiatic school is undoubtedly a complicated 
ąuestion. The subjective estimation of geographical and political location of Russia, 
nationalism and radically anti-Westem attitude undermine the scientific value of 
Eurasianism. Nevertheless, in the Eurasiatic thought one can find threads going 
beyond the one-sided ideological point of view. The reinterpretation of the history of 
the Russian State sińce its emergence in the late Middle Ages from Kievan Rus until 
the revolution and the Soviet Union, independently of ideological intentions, is an 
interesting attempt o f solving the basie problems of Russian history. The Eurasiatic 
way of solving these problems is consistent in essence with the opinions of Western 
historians. Another problem is the justification of such rebellions from the point of 
view of traditional Russian histiography and historiosophy and the formulation of the 
problem of genesis of the Russian State and the Bolshevik Revolution. Maybe its 
reasons can be found in the real estimation of geographical and political potential of 
Russia. If Russia was not able to become either the third Rome according to Russian 
messiahnists’ wishes, or the leader of Slavic confederation, which was the 
Slavophils’ political aim, then it had to remain the “steppe empire”. In such an 
approach, one can see the attitude of resignation but Eurasiatists’ political realism as 
well. Eurasiatists rejecting eschatology focused their attention on Russia not on the 
world as Bolsheviks did. A similar position was taken, for example, by Solzhenitsyn 
who claimed that Bolsheviks forgot Russia while conąuering the world10. The Soviet 
Empire fell into decline because it was created according to the Leninist inter-
10 A. S o lz h e n i t s y n ,  List do przywódców Związku Sowieckiego (Letter to the Leaders o f  the Soviet 
Union o f5 th  September 1973), [in:] „Żyj bez kłamstwa". Publicystyka z lat 1973-1980, Warsaw 1995.
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pretation of Marxist eschatology to spread the communist ideology all over the world 
but this task surpassed its strength.
The scientific interpretation of the history of Eurasia, most clearly developed 
in Gumilov’s theory of ethnogeny, despite its pretentious or sometimes even bizarre 
elements still deserves attention. L. Gumilov was an outstanding geographer and 
historian, investigator of Russia and peoples of “the Great Steppe” and their history 
using in his investigations methods of the natural sciences. The process of ethnogeny 
is according to Gumilov’s views, a natural one. This surprising statement can be 
elucidated by the fact that Gumilov focused his attention on steppe peoples i.e. living 
in different geographical conditions than, for example, peoples o f Europę. Gumilov’s 
theory of ethnogeny may come true on the Great Steppe but does not have to in 
Western Europę. Similarly, sociological theories of Chicago School, for example, 
may come true in Chicago but not necessarily in Stockholm or Helsinki. Chicago 
school has been even criticised that the Chicago fitting concept o f “natural city 
zones” does not fit other American cities. The investigator of Black Americans’ life 
should concentrate his attention on different ąuestions than the researcher of English 
workers’ life. A Statement true in one situation can be false in another: “verite en- 
deca, erreur au-dela” as Pascal noticed.
One should emphasise that Gumilov’s views are as original as those of the 
Western representatives of environmental movement in historiosophy if only to 
mention “The Pulse of Asia” and “Civilization and Climate” by E. Huntington. 
Western sociologists limited by their exploratory horizon and methods kept 20th- 
century environmentalists, as e.g. E. Huntington and T. G. Tylor, at a “methodological 
distance” treating them as anachronistic eccentrics. In the light of the latest 
anthropological and ethnological achievements, one can try to “rehabilitate” Gumilov’s 
theory of ethnogeny. The outstanding Russian anthropologist W. Alekseev investiga- 
ting the process of race genesis used the concept of genetic focus. It denotes the 
primary territory limited by natural barriers on which a given race has taken shape 
under the influence of local physical and geographical factors11. The genetic focus is 
similar to Gumilov’s ethnogeny and there are much more analogies between the two 
theories which cannot be discussed here for lack of space. In such a genetic focus, the 
process of race genesis would be correlated with the process of origination and 
formation of languages, ethnogeny and the genesis of social and economic relations.
The theory of genetic focus has significant scientific conseąuences. It 
undermines (among other things) J. Deniker’s thesis about the lack o f correlation 
between racial and ethnological-linguistic features of human groups. It seems that on 
its basis it is possible to explain an interesting phenomenon of the complete absence 
of any similarity between languages belonging to different families. The Indo- 
European or Caucasus languages do not reveal any similarity (to say nothing of the 
common grammatical structures as it has been proved by modem nativists and 
especially N. Chomsky). It probably occurs due to the fact that the process of 
origination of the great-grand languages of these families was taking place in separate
"  W. A le k s e e v ,  Geografia ras ludzkich, W arsaw 1979.
focuses and the languages were not able to interact. The theory of genetic focus can be 
important for the methods of studying the origins and development of anthropological 
phenomena. From this point of view, there should be a strict correspondence between 
a particular branch of “genealogical tree” of a given anthropological phenomenon and 
a given focus. In connection with this theory, using the method of geographical 
location one can establish the sequence of appropriate changes of a given anthropolo­
gical phenomenon.
The theory of focus can even have historiosophical conseąuences. It suggests 
the development of humanity from genetic focus to the “global village”. Genetic 
focus like Gumilov’s ethnos is precisely dependent on local geographical conditions 
and joint with the landscape. In the face of the total mixture of population and its 
anthropological and cultural features in the global village, all local geographical 
factors will cease to operate: the situation becomes entirely “non geographical”. 
Socialist utopians (e.g. L. M. Deschamps) had the right intuition while writing about 
peoples’ total unification even in the sense of physical appearance in the futurę 
society. These processes can occur in real situations. The concept of the evolution of 
humanity between two “ideał types” of society: the genetic focus and the global 
village is similar, in some respect, to well-known theories of H. M. McLuhan, P. Teilhard 
de Chardin and W. I. Viemadskii. However, it still reąuires further studies.
The last decade became the period of renaissance and reinterpretation of 
Eurasiatic ideology. The tum of the 1980s and 1990s of the last century shook the 
world so no wonder that a wide rangę of political concepts appeared to explain the 
essence of the tum and making predictions for the futurę as well. It is amazing that 
during a few years the world classic scientific and popular literature on this subject 
has been established. In comparison with other concepts such as F. Fukuyama’s 
theory of the end of history or S. Huntington’s theory of collision of civilizations, 
Russian political thought of the last few years has some special features. Its starting 
point is the interest in a real state, which lost the status of a world power and so to 
say found itself in political emptiness. This emptiness is being filled with both 
relatively new concepts and those, which refer to the tradition of Russian political 
thought.
Is the modem version of Eurasianism or even Neo-Eurasianism a creative 
explication or only ideological deformation and degeneration of the original thought 
of the school? In Russia, many circles and magazines mention the Eurasiatic 
tradition12. Unfortunately, one should presume that Eurasiatists would not be able to 
identify themselves with the majority of them especially with extremely nationalist 
streams o f the modem Russian political scene appealing to the tradition of 
geopolitics. A. Dugin, whose book entitled Osnovii geopoloticki. Geopolititseskoie 
budustseie Rosii became the kind of the Bibie of the modem Russian nationalism, 
can serve as an example13. Dugin uses Eurasiatic concepts as e.g. “ideocracy” in 
a tendentious and selective way. The scientific value o f Dugin’s geopolitics is
12 S. M azu rek , Eurazjatyzm rosyjski -  historiozofia i ideologia, “Archiwum historii filozofii i myśli 
społecznej” 1996, vol. 41, p. 169.
13 A. D u p in , Osnoviigeopoliticki. Geopolititseskoie budustseie Rosii, Moscow 1997.
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doubtful not only because of his nationalist subjectivism and because of his political 
engagement but for other reasons including archaic scientific methods and referring 
to out-of-date scientific authorities, especially to the dualistic concepts of English 
geopoliticians opposing the land and sea powers. A strange mixture of elements 
taken from Eurasiatic, German and Anglo-Saxon geopolitics as well as R. Guenon’s 
and J. Evoli’s ideologies of integral traditionalism and the withdrawal into pre- 
scientific lanes of spatial mysticism and “sacral geography” are the reasons why 
Dugin and other thinkers or political activists who are much alike are no more than 
intellectual shadows of their Eurasiatic ancestors. The repeating history becomes its 
own parody. A process that is true for the history of science as well.
